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Abstract
To further dialogue between theory and research on deliberative
democracy, I advocate abandoning tests of deliberative theory per
se and instead developing “middle-range” theories that are each important, speciﬁable, and falsiﬁable parts of deliberative democratic
theory. By replacing vaguely deﬁned entities with more concrete, circumscribed concepts, and by requiring empirically and theoretically
grounded hypotheses about speciﬁc relationships between those
concepts, researchers may come to understand which elements of
the deliberative experience are crucial to particular valued outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The dialogue between political theorists interested in deliberative democracy and those
who study deliberative democracy empirically
has been strained at best. As Thompson (2008)
describes in this volume, both groups seem to
realize that they have much to gain from one
another, yet frustration remains on both sides
due to our inability to accept one another’s
assumptions and even to understand one another’s terms. Indeed, for many political scientists, reading theorists’ accounts of deliberative democracy can be aggravating. On the
one hand, many of the assertions seem to cry
out for empirical veriﬁcation. On the other
hand, much of the empirical work in this vein
has been deemed irrelevant to the theory of
deliberative democracy by political theorists.
Excellent reviews of this literature have
been provided elsewhere (in addition to
Thompson’s article, see also Ryfe 2005, Delli
Carpini et al. 2004, Mendelberg 2002). My
purpose here is to delve deeper into the
conversation—or lack thereof—between theory and empirical research in this important
area to see what progress might be made.
In contrast to Thompson, I approach this
dilemma from the perspective of empirical social scientists who want to test the posited
beneﬁcial consequences of deliberative theory. The general question before us as empirical researchers is: How can we take what has
been, by its origins, a normative theory and
turn it into an empirically testable theory?
I begin with an overview of the problems
involved in constructing deliberative democratic theory in terms that satisfy the requirements for a productive and testable social theory. A great deal of the difﬁculty in
this conversation results from deﬁnitions of
deliberative democracy that are too broad
and that effectively insulate the theory from
falsiﬁcation. Falsiﬁability—the possibility of
refutation—is held to be essential to the scientiﬁc method because it offers the possibility of scientiﬁc progress: Faulty theories will
encounter refuting evidence and will be discarded in favor of other theories. Philosophers
522
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of science consider falsiﬁability an essential
requirement for a theory to be deemed scientiﬁc (see Popper 1963); some go so far as to
say that unfalsiﬁable hypotheses are meaningless. As I describe below, unfalsiﬁable aspects
of deliberative theory translate into concrete
obstacles that prevent testing and improving
the theory.
To further dialogue between theory and research on deliberative democracy, I advocate
abandoning tests of deliberative theory per
se, advocating instead developing “middlerange” theories that are each important, speciﬁable, and falsiﬁable parts of deliberative
democratic theory.1 Transforming deliberative theory into middle-range theory means
replacing vaguely deﬁned entities with more
concrete, circumscribed concepts, and substituting hypotheses about speciﬁc relationships
between those concepts for grander theoretical frameworks. If, as Ryfe (2005, p. 64) suggests, “The theory of deliberative democracy
needlessly remains removed from its practice,” then this is a necessary step toward rectifying this problem.
This article explores the nature of the
problem facing empirical researchers and then
proposes how they might, nevertheless, move
forward. In addition to helping bridge the
normative-empirical divide in a way that
moves empirical research forward, my goal is
to illuminate for theorists the sources of difﬁculty facing empirical researchers who genuinely want to add to this conversation. While
Thompson (2008) has done an excellent job illuminating the perspective of normative theorists, I seek to detail the predicament of the
social science researcher interested in deliberative theory. As a social scientist, my goal
is not to play armchair political theorist, but
1

Merton (1957) advocated the “middle-range” approach as
a means of bridging the gap between theory and empirical
evidence and thus advancing social science. Middle-range
theory suggests that “it is hopeless and quixotic to try to
determine the overarching independent variable” as “grand
theory” often tries to do (Boudon 1991, p. 519), but it is
nonetheless important to take “theory” seriously, that is,
to formulate a consolidating idea about a set of hypotheses
that can be empirically tested.
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rather to translate the theory from one set of
terms and standards to another. If researchers
do not go about testing deliberative theory in
a way that speaks to political theory, then the
theory is unlikely to realize its potential theoretically or empirically, and political scientists
will have missed an important opportunity.

CAN EMPIRICAL THEORY
SPEAK TO NORMATIVE
THEORY?
Thompson (2008) characterizes empirical research on deliberative democracy as follows:
“They extract from isolated passages in various theoretical writings a simpliﬁed statement
about one or more beneﬁts of deliberative
democracy, compress it into a testable hypothesis, ﬁnd or (more often) artiﬁcially create a
site in which people talk about politics, and
conclude that deliberation does not produce
the beneﬁts the theory promised and may even
be counterproductive.”
Theorists clearly ﬁnd empirical contributions to this conversation lacking; most of the
research is said to be “not fully engaged with
the normative theory” (Thompson 2008). But
it is not clear if the conclusions reached by
these studies are what is deemed objectionable, or the way the studies are conducted or
evaluated. The latter is the more appropriate
concern for empirical researchers. For a theory to be falsiﬁable, one should consider disconﬁrmations as valid as conﬁrmations. Given
the well-documented bias in published studies toward signiﬁcant ﬁndings as opposed to
null hypotheses, it would be surprising indeed if the outcomes of published studies
were tilted in this direction (see Gerber &
Malhotra 2007, 2008). Thompson’s observation suggests that, in fact, disconﬁrming evidence is more prevalent than conﬁrming evidence. Other summaries have characterized
ﬁndings as mixed, which comes closer to my
own reading. From a normative point of view,
there may be legitimate complaints about the
nature of the research questions scholars ask,
but there is little basis for criticizing the con-

clusions these studies reach, assuming they are
done skillfully.
Normative theory requires ethical commitments on the part of researchers; that is,
some kinds of attitudes and behaviors must
be valued above others. However, normative
theory in this case also promises empirically
observable beneﬁts. Whether at the individual
level (e.g., greater tolerance, depth of understanding) or the level of the collective (e.g., a
consensual decision, increased social capital),
deliberation promises observable beneﬁts.
The whole reason deliberative democracy is
normatively desirable is because it is thought
to produce tangible beneﬁts for democratic
citizens and societies.
Of course, anyone who has read empirical
research on deliberative theory will recognize
that it is also value-laden, in that such studies typically begin and end with an assertion
that some outcomes are more promising or
disappointing than others. Empirical research
ﬁndings are interesting and/or important precisely because they tell us something about
some consequence that is positively or negatively valued.
Although normative theory is obviously
not testable in the usual sense, to the extent
that scholars agree on which criteria are beneﬁcial for a democratic society, then we can,
within the boundaries of these speciﬁc criteria, evaluate whether deliberation contributes
toward those ends. This is the shared ground
where normative theory and empirical social
science meet. Regardless of how one deﬁnes
or studies deliberation, certain kinds of outcomes are consensually valued by theorists
and empiricists alike. These include, but are
not limited to, more public-spirited attitudes;
more informed citizens; greater understanding of the sources of, or rationales behind,
public disagreements; a stronger sense of
political efﬁcacy; willingness to compromise;
greater interest in political participation;
and, for some theorists, a binding consensus
decision. The perceived legitimacy of the decision outcome is also argued to be enhanced
through deliberation, although some theorists
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suggest that regardless of how it is perceived,
the process is inherently legitimizing. Still, it
is difﬁcult to conceive of inherent legitimacy
beneﬁting a democratic society without also
being perceived as such by its citizens. Moreover, inherent legitimacy is not observable;
empirical researchers must, of necessity, study
perceptions or some other manifestation of
legitimacy.
But all of this is not to say that the distinction between these two lines of research
is murky. The key difference is that, in normative political theory, the activity described
as deliberation is assumed to have certain beneﬁcial outcomes, and in empirical research,
it is hypothesized to have those same desirable
outcomes. Hypotheses often turn out to be
wrong, but assumptions, by their very nature,
cannot be.
So although deliberative theorists may argue that they are not trying to make empirical
predictions so much as “clarifying a normative standard” (Neblo 2005, p. 172), deliberative theory does make implicit empirical
predictions, and empirical research does incorporate implicit normative commitments.
The challenge for advocates of deliberative
democracy is to persuade skeptics who want
evidence, rather than theoretical logic, that
people will, on average, be better citizens if
they take part in deliberation (see Przeworski
1998, p. 142).
This general challenge is one that requires
empirical research. Having established some
common ground that might form the basis for bridging theoretical and empirical approaches, I next examine how well deliberative theory ﬁts the requirements of a useful
and productive theory for purposes of empirical social science.

WHAT MAKES GOOD
EMPIRICAL THEORY?
The most general requirement for productive empirical theory is falsiﬁability, which is
deemed a minimal requirement for a productive social theory. In a nutshell, for a theory
524
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to be falsiﬁable, it must be the case that if a
study were set up in a particular way, its results
could conceivably contradict the predictions
of the theory. Although no single empirical
test ever completely refutes or “disproves” a
theory, it must be possible that evidence could
counter the theory’s assumptions, and a steady
accumulation of such negative evidence would
build a convincing case against it.
Falsiﬁability is probably the single most intransigent issue in getting normative theory
and empirical research to speak to one another
in the realm of deliberative theory. Several
problems conspire to make deliberative theory elusive in this respect. For some theorists,
deliberation is simply deﬁned as intrinsically
good. Obviously, such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant (see, e.g., Stokes 1998).
But even without the assumption of intrinsic
goodness, more complex problems hinder the
interaction between empirical studies and political theory.
It is difﬁcult to envision an empirical test
that might produce evidence construed by
theorists and empiricists alike as disconﬁrming the claims of deliberative theory. This is
because deliberation falls short on many of the
standards deemed essential to good social science theory, at least as the theory is currently
construed. Beyond the general issue of falsiﬁability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for productive social
theory that are enumerated in virtually any
textbook:
1. clearly deﬁned concepts;
2. speciﬁcation of logical relationships
among concepts within the theory;
3. consistency between hypotheses and evidence accumulated to date.
It is, of course, unfair to criticize a normative theory for lacking the characteristics required of productive social science theory. But
criticism is not my main purpose. Instead, I
want to take seriously the admonition that the
two subﬁelds should talk to one another. To
make a dialogue possible, this normative theory must be translated into the terminology
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of empirical social science and must then be
subjected to the standards of theory testing
within the social science tradition. It is crucial
to address these three problems in order to
accumulate useful empirical evidence on the
potential of deliberative democracy.
Social scientists generally deﬁne “theory”
as a set of interrelated statements intended to
explain and/or make predictions about some
aspect of social life. Toward those ends, a
good theory is supposed to have well-deﬁned
constructs of general theoretical interest. It
is supposed to describe logical associations
among these constructs (which are most often causal associations), and it should allow
for connections between the theoretical constructs and observable entities. When theories cannot meet these three criteria, they are
generally unproductive in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of interest.2
What happens when empirical researchers
attempt to translate deliberative theory into
these terms? First, as Thompson points out,
they discover a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. Moreover, the deﬁnitions offered by
theorists frequently conﬂate causes (criteria
deﬁning deliberation) and effects (its beneﬁcial consequences). Second, the tests of deliberative theory offered to date typically do not
develop well-speciﬁed explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its many
proposed beneﬁts. Third, deliberative theory
is inconsistent with much of what is already
known about political discourse in group contexts. Many, though not all, of the hypotheses
that ﬂow from the deliberative framework are
not well-grounded in either previous theory
or empirical evidence.
Below, I discuss each of these three problems. I then turn to the more constructive
business of suggesting how empiricists might
more productively approach deliberative theory in the future.

2

For further descriptions of these criteria for productive
empirical theory, see Hoyle et al. (2002) or Babbie (2001).

CLEARLY DEFINED CONCEPTS
Deliberative theory includes many concepts
that have generated tremendous research interest; this is precisely why it has become so
popular. Concepts such as reason-giving and
equal participation and so forth have become
valuable constructs in empirical theory and research. But it would be a stretch to claim that
deliberation is itself a well-deﬁned concept.
In fact, it may be fair to say that there are as
many deﬁnitions of deliberation as there are
theorists, although there are certainly commonalities among these conceptualizations as
well.
In empirical social science, conceptual definitions are often arbitrary. They must ﬁt logically within the broader theoretical framework of relationships proposed, but it is widely
recognized as a senseless and unproductive exercise to haggle about what qualiﬁes as true
deliberation. However, to the extent that any
given researcher speciﬁes necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, we at least have a sense of
what qualiﬁed as deliberation for this particular study, and what its consequences were.
The pattern of ﬁndings over time thus gradually reveals which elements in the deﬁnitions
best produce which consequences.
As Thompson (2008) points out, theorists
disagree on many elements deﬁning deliberation, such as whether deliberation must
culminate in a binding consensus, whether
it must necessarily be public, or whether informal conversations among ordinary people
qualify. Indeed, much of the normative literature is concerned with reﬁning these deﬁnitions and debating what should or should not
be required.
Although it may seem desirable to let a
thousand ﬂowers bloom in this regard, if we
cannot agree on what the independent variable is, we cannot hope to systematically evaluate its impact. Interestingly, the number of
conceptions of deliberation is surpassed perhaps only by the number of versions of social capital, another concept that has intrigued
both theorists and empiricists. Perhaps a

www.annualreviews.org • Is Deliberative Democratic Theory Falsifiable?

525

ANRV344-PL11-23

ARI

17 April 2008

13:16

certain amount of conceptual ambiguity is inherent in extremely rich concepts. Whatever
the cause, the lack of agreement about what
constitutes deliberation makes it extremely
difﬁcult for empirical researchers to address
the claims of normative theory. How can one
safely assert that deliberation has occurred
when there are no necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions routinely applied to this concept?
For those who study political discourse as it
occurs in real-world contexts, how can one
decide if the type of discourse that transpired
qualiﬁes?
For theorists, this lack of agreement and
uneven stipulation of deﬁnitions is less troubling. But for those who want to know
whether deliberation produces its promised
beneﬁts before they sink millions of dollars
of foundation money into encouraging more
of it, the uncertainty is problematic indeed.
Thompson’s (2008) review of what should and
should not qualify according to normative
theory illustrates a desire not to exclude, but in
so doing renders deliberation a far less useful
concept for empirical research than it might
be. For example, Thompson suggests that ordinary political discussion should be distinguished from the decision-oriented talk that
constitutes deliberation. But this argument
is seemingly contradicted by the subsequent
suggestion that “maintaining this distinction
should not be taken to imply that other forms
of discussion are somehow less worthy of a
place in deliberative democracy, but we can
more clearly retain the connection to the central aim of deliberative theory if we treat those
other activities as part of a larger deliberative
process, rather than instances of deliberation
per se.” Likewise, Thompson suggests that although like-minded discussion does not qualify as deliberation, “[T]hat is not to say that
discussion among like-minded people cannot
contribute to deliberative democracy.”
Empirical researchers attempting to test
deliberative theory can be forgiven for wanting to bang their collective heads against a wall
in reaction to deﬁnitions of this kind. What
does it mean to say that something is not part
526
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of deliberation but is part of the larger deliberative process? And if one theorist’s version of
normative theory includes the requirement of
consensus decision-making whereas another’s
does not, then how do social scientists design
studies that address the implications of deliberative theory?
It is commonly claimed that empirical
studies do not fully embrace deliberative theory, and of course this statement is entirely
correct. No study could include all criteria invoked by all theorists collectively, and to do so
would violate even other theorists’ conceptualizations of deliberation. Thus, the conversation between theorists and empiricists is next
to impossible if one aims to produce research
that can be used to decide whether to pursue
deliberation at all, or whether such practices
need reﬁnement in order to work beneﬁcially.
The common problem faced by empirical researchers is that when beneﬁts are not found
from a given conceptualization of deliberation
in a particular study, the null ﬁndings are as
easily attributed to the operationalization of
deliberation as to the theory itself. Given this
state of affairs, it is difﬁcult to envision disconﬁrming evidence that would be widely accepted as such.
Theorists are loath to exclude many kinds
of political talk from the deliberative framework; in fact, the trajectory has been toward
progressively greater inclusiveness, incorporating emotional as well as rational appeals,
informal speech as well as rule-bound discourse, and so forth. This very openness delays progress in understanding deliberation’s
consequences. If the deliberative umbrella is
too broad, then it is not clear how deliberative theory can be differentiated from any of
dozens of other theories. Indeed, much of the
literature cited in overviews of evidence on
deliberation does not purport to be about deliberation so much as about persuasion, social interaction, procedural fairness, etc. (see,
e.g., Delli Carpini et al. 2004). Nor is it clear
what a given conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation
says about deliberative theory. A more narrowly speciﬁed independent variable might
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better serve progress toward understanding
how to achieve the ends sought by advocates of
deliberation.
In short, my quarrel is not with how theorists have chosen to deﬁne deliberation but
with the fact that the concept itself is a moving
target. If every theorist’s deﬁnition is somewhat different from the next, then it is impossible to study deliberation in a way that theorists collectively ﬁnd relevant to their work.
Upon encountering an unsupportive (or supportive) ﬁnding, it is far too easy to dismiss
it as uninformative because the deliberation
that took place in that particular study did not
satisfy all of the prerequisites offered collectively by deliberative theory, even if it did satisfy some theorists’ deﬁnitions.
The solution that theorists have generally offered is not a clear deﬁnition of this
phenomenon but an evaluative distinction
between “good” deliberation and “bad” deliberation. If we grade the many forms of deliberation along a continuous scale from good to
bad, then we can predict that more beneﬁcial
consequences will result from good deliberation than from bad. To the extent that good
deliberation actually brings about more of the
beneﬁcial consequences than bad deliberation, we can conclude that deliberation is delivering the beneﬁts that the theory promises.
The more that political discourse approaches
the ideal of equal opportunities to speak, for
example, the more it will bring about the proposed beneﬁts. The more reason-giving that
occurs, the more valuable should be the consequences of this activity. Fishkin (1995, p. 41)
calls this continuum “incompleteness”:
When some citizens are unwilling to weigh
some of the arguments in the debate, the
process is less deliberative because it is incomplete in the manner speciﬁed. In practical contexts, a great deal of incompleteness
must be tolerated. Hence, when we talk of
improving deliberation, it is a matter of improving the completeness of the debate and
the public’s engagement in it, not a matter
of perfecting it. . .

It is unclear, however, at what point a process of this kind is so “incomplete” as to be
irrelevant to the study of deliberation. Moreover, the logic behind the idea of a continuum
of predictions is not as simple as it ﬁrst appears. For example, should bad deliberation
merely produce fewer beneﬁcial effects than
good deliberation? Or should bad deliberation produce deleterious effects, such that bad
deliberation is worse than no deliberation at
all? Moreover, are some evaluative standards
more important than others, such that no beneﬁcial consequences should be expected unless some minimal conditions are ﬁrst met?
Because so many different criteria have
been proposed for the deliberative ideal, using
evaluative standards is unfortunately no easier
than establishing clear conceptual criteria. In
practice, good deliberation is often deﬁned as
deliberation that produces the desired consequences outlined in the theory. This circularity makes it impossible to use this approach to
evaluate the claims of deliberative theory.
A related confounding of cause and effect
manifests itself in two different kinds of claims
involving deliberation and its consequences.
The more obviously difﬁcult situation is when
the independent variable (deliberation) is deﬁned in terms of its hypothesized effects. As
Elster (1998, p. 9) notes, empiricists tend to
be interested in “whether and when the empirically identiﬁable phenomenon of discussion has good results, rather than to deﬁne it
such that it is intrinsically desirable.” Theorists are more likely to treat deliberation as
something to promote rather than evaluate.
As Fearon (1998, p. 63) notes, to facilitate
meaningful empirical claims about deliberation, “we should keep distinct (a) arguments
for why more deliberation would be a good
thing and (b) arguments that in effect deﬁne deliberation or ‘deliberative democracy’
so that these entail good things.”
A second source of confusion in understanding the consequences of deliberation is
studies that “test” deliberative theory by focusing on the extent to which political discourse meets some set of qualiﬁcations. Based
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on such assessments, some scholars infer various beneﬁts from the quality of the discussion.
Just as an analysis of the content of a political advertisement tells us nothing about its
effects on voters, the content of deliberation
tells us nothing about whether it changes its
participants in the directions theorists hope.
More importantly, this confusion means that
those claiming to “test” or “evaluate” deliberative theory are often testing completely
different hypotheses. For example, some of
the “tests” of deliberative theory identiﬁed
by Thompson (2008) are examinations of
whether political discussion in a particular
time or place meets the standards to be considered deliberative. Does the discussion involve reason-giving, equal participation, and
so forth? Other studies also reviewed as empirical tests of deliberative theory evaluate
whether, once discussion does meet one or
more standards for deliberation, it produces
any of its theoretically claimed beneﬁts.
These are two very different research questions, and their conclusions are logically independent of one another. A given instance of
political discourse might meet all of a given
set of requirements for deliberation and yet
still not produce the beneﬁts that have been
assumed. Likewise, political discourse might
not meet the criteria for deliberation but still
produce some of the beneﬁcial consequences
claimed by deliberative theory. For example, in my social network studies (see Mutz
2002), I ﬁnd that exposure to cross-cutting
political discourse produces greater tolerance
and greater awareness of rationales for oppositional political views. These effects result from exposure to oppositional political
views even without all the trappings of deliberative interaction. In our study of political
discussions in the American workplace, Jeff
Mondak and I similarly ﬁnd that people are
inﬂuenced in the direction of political tolerance and greater awareness of the rationales
for oppositional views simply by listening to
their coworkers talk about their political views
(Mutz & Mondak 2006). No one would call
such experiences deliberation; participation in
528
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the conversation is not even necessary. Yet understanding the kinds of beneﬁts that derive
from simply listening to others is central to
understanding the beneﬁts of the deliberative
process as a whole (Mutz & Mondak 2006,
Mondak & Mutz 2006).
Most theorists and empiricists agree on the
general point that deliberative encounters are
nearly always “incomplete” to some degree,
if for totally different reasons. No one claims
that the ideal speech situation exists in ﬂesh
and blood. Instead, according to theorists, deliberation is “still in large part a critical and
oppositional ideal” (Bohman & Rehg 1998,
p. 422). It is a useful ideal type, even if it is
never realized. But, as empiricists are likely to
question, is it wise to work toward the realization of a goal that we are uncertain will prove
beneﬁcial?
In my view, whether an instance of discourse meets a set of criteria to qualify as
deliberative is irrelevant for theorists and empiricists alike, though for somewhat different
reasons than Thompson (2008) suggests. He
notes: “Although critics repeatedly brandish
the ﬁndings of inequality to declare deliberative democracy fatally ﬂawed, most deliberative theorists are neither surprised nor discouraged. . . . Research that shows speciﬁcally
what conditions and changes might mitigate
inequality can be useful.” Arguably, this approach puts the cart before the horse. Before
we set a goal of equality within a deliberative context, or attempt to change decisionmaking processes to meet any other deliberative standard, we should ﬁrst have evidence
that the theory works as advertised and that
these particular standards are crucial to its
beneﬁcial outcomes. To extend this example,
until we know that moving closer to a goal
of equal participation will ultimately produce
more beneﬁcial goods, setting such a goal
seems premature. At this point in the development of this research, evaluations of the quality of existing instances of deliberation are irrelevant to empiricists as well, but not because
they can always be made more ideal. Knowing what a given instance of deliberation is
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like simply cannot tell us anything about its
consequences.
The fact that the ideal conditions do not
exist introduces a painful circularity into studies that attempt to test whether deliberation
produces any of the beneﬁts that are theoretically predicted. If negative evidence is produced by a study that attempts to look at the
consequences of deliberation, such evidence
is easily dismissed because the discussion in
question did not meet all of the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions to qualify as deliberation.
Once again, deliberative theory is rendered
unfalsiﬁable.
To summarize, studies of the quality of deliberation should not be mistaken for evidence
of its beneﬁcial effects. Likewise, deliberation
cannot proﬁtably be deﬁned according to the
effects it is anticipated to produce. Tests of
whether the conditions necessary for deliberation are actually occurring must be differentiated from evaluations of whether beneﬁts accrue when the conditions do occur. The
latter is an attempt to test deliberative theory, whereas the former is purely a descriptive
exercise that will not facilitate future predictions about the effectiveness of deliberative
decision-making processes.
As Thompson (2008) summarizes, “The
conditions under which deliberative democracy thrives may be quite rare and difﬁcult to achieve.” But Thompson also suggests
that empirical researchers focus on identifying conditions under which deliberative theory works, for purposes of ﬁguring out how
we can make it work by changing unfavorable
conditions to favorable ones. At this juncture,
the traditions of normative theory begin to
befuddle the empiricist. This is because deliberative democratic theory is unabashedly a
social movement as well as a theory. Its advocates promote it not only as a pet theory
but also as a social cause. Whether and why it
works to bring about the ends that deliberative theorists seek remains to be seen.
Rather than “making it work” or searching long and hard for conditions under which
it might be made to work, I suggest a some-

what different tack for social scientists, one
that slowly but progressively accumulates evidence by testing parts of the theory while
also leaving open the possibility that these
ends might be better achieved another way.
Although deliberative theory is full of inspiring and promising ideas, researchers should be
under no obligation to “make it work” if the
conditions under which it is beneﬁcial turn
out to be rare. If there is an easier, more efﬁcient way to achieve some of these same ends,
scholars should be open to these possibilities.
The important question is not whether deliberative processes can be forced into a mold
that will produce positive consequences, but
whether this decision-making process is the
best way to achieve the desired ends relative
to other plausible possibilities.

SPECIFICATION OF LOGICAL
RELATIONSHIPS
In addition to requiring well-deﬁned concepts, empirical theories also require that relationships between concepts be speciﬁed in
a logical manner. Assuming for the moment
that we have a set of necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions that constitute deliberation, and
thus lack of clarity is no longer a problem, two
additional complications come into play. One
problem stems from lack of attention to the
internal logic of these relationships, and the
second involves the nature of the assumed relationships between deliberation and its beneﬁts in this multifaceted theory.
As reﬂected in Thompson’s (2008) article,
theorists are realistic enough to understand
that empirical tests of deliberation cannot be
limited to the infrequent achievement of these
ideals. Partial successes can also produce empirical evidence that speaks to the theory. As
Thompson suggests, “The closer the actual
deliberation comes to meeting the standards,
the better it is in terms of deliberative theory.” This frequently unstated assumption has
allowed at least some research to be characterized as empirically “testing” deliberative
theory. We do not need to wait for status
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Example of middle-range approach to deliberative hypotheses

differences among human beings to disappear
in order to test the theory, nor for all participation to be completely equal.
Unfortunately, to date, the “black box” of
deliberation has been exactly that—a morass
of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions all
thrown together, without speciﬁcation of why
each of these various components is necessary,
nor theory that links each of them to a speciﬁed desirable outcome. As illustrated by the
left-hand column in Table 1, the list of components necessary for discourse to be deemed
deliberative is extensive if one simultaneously
considers all that have been suggested.
To begin to understand the impact of such
a long laundry list of factors, scholars should
examine the impact of just one or two of these
factors at a time. One study, for example,
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might tell us that moderators, by enhancing
equality of participation, help produce better cooperation. Another might demonstrate
that greater reason-giving by participants enhances learning of oppositional perspectives.
Discussions that enforce high standards of civility might also produce higher levels of willingness to compromise. The important part
of this enterprise should be to identify which
characteristics of deliberative practice produce which kinds of desirable outcomes.
Many of the factors listed in Table 1
already have been studied from this perspective. For example, experimental research suggests that a face-to-face context increases
people’s likelihood of cooperation (e.g.,
Bornstein 1992, Sally 1995), thus validating the usefulness of that component of
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deliberation in producing cooperation. But
Barker & Hansen (2005) ﬁnd that inducing
deeper, more systematic processing of information produces less consistent attitudes than
a control group, thus suggesting that opinion
consistency is not a probable outcome of increased reﬂection. Yet another study focusing
on consensual decision making showed that
exchanging information about preferences increased consensual decision making, but it did
so even without any discussion (Gaertner et al.
1999). Notably, in each of these examples,
the independent variable is not deliberation
per se; it is some component said to partially
comprise deliberation. In addition, the chosen independent variable cannot logically be
expected to have an impact on all of the dependent variables in the same, beneﬁcial direction. A given component might produce a
positive impact on one outcome and a negative effect, or none at all, on another (see, e.g.,
Mutz 2006).
In reality, it is highly unlikely that all of
the conditions on the left side of the table
are necessary for each of the outcomes on
the right. Moreover, to rationalize deliberative theory as a middle-range theory, scholars
need to ﬁgure out precisely what elements in
the left-hand column are logically related to
the consequences on the right. For example,
it makes sense that people must be exposed to
disagreement and reason-giving in order to
develop a heightened awareness of rationales
for oppositional views. It does not necessarily
make sense, however, that this exchange must
occur face to face, or in a group rather than a
dyad. Not all of these conditions are necessary
for learning to occur. Likewise, it makes sense
that civility of discourse should be important
if the enterprise is to increase people’s willingness to compromise with one another and
to increase levels of social trust. On the other
hand, if the outcome of interest is greater internal consistency of opinion, then it makes
little sense that civility should be required.
One can conceivably treat the two columns
in Table 1 as opportunities for lines to be
drawn to indicate when there is a clear theo-

retical reason to expect a relationship between
an element in the left-hand column and another in the right-hand column. But to argue that everything on the left has a theoretical relationship to everything on the right
stretches believability. It is this “grand theory” approach to deliberative democracy that
has undermined progress toward understanding what is important for which purposes. It is
plausible that multiple conditions on the left
are necessary to produce a given outcome on
the right, but it is implausible that each and
every factor in this list must be aligned in order to produce any consequence of value.
For example, the kind of direct, face-toface exchange that traditionally characterizes
deliberation need not occur in order for people to become better informed. There are undoubtedly easier, far less expensive means of
producing that end than hosting a deliberative poll, as successful information campaigns
have demonstrated (see, e.g., Klingemann &
Roemmele 2007). Moreover, enhancing the
depth of understanding of one’s own position
relative to others’ probably does not require a
public forum; it happens commonly in private
settings as well. If one wants to enhance mutual respect among those of opposing views,
then civility is probably a requirement for the
discourse to be effective, but requiring that the
group reach a consensus seems superﬂuous to
this particular goal. If one envisions Table 1
as a matching game, in which everything on
the right must be matched to one or more
factors on the left, then we have a primitive
middle-range theory generator for purposes
of deliberative theory.
By opening the black box of deliberation
and sorting out the importance of its contents in relation to various consequences, empirical research could greatly enhance the capacity of deliberative theory to contribute to
democratic society. Few contexts demand all
of the outcomes listed on the right side of
Table 1, so advocates of deliberative encounters would simply need to decide what was
most important to achieve in a given context
and design accordingly. In addition, by paring
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down the list of required conditions for
any given outcome, advocates of deliberative
democracy could more efﬁciently and realistically achieve those goals. But this can only
happen if empirical scholars consider deliberation as one small group of requirements at a
time. Holistic consideration of the concept is
clearly an impediment to advancing this kind
of understanding.
I suspect that, in the long run, deliberative theory may end up with a research history
similar to that of intergroup contact theory.
Initiated by Allport (1954), this inﬂuential
social theory suggested that contact among
members of different racial groups would
lead to greater mutual understanding and reduce prejudice. Allport’s version of the theory began with four necessary conditions for
the type of contact that would prove beneﬁcial. Unfortunately, it accumulated so many
additional necessary conditions over the years
that eventually it was deemed a failure because the laundry list of requirements simply
became too long to be feasible. The theory’s
extensive requirements made it seem impractical as a means of reducing prejudice and
stereotyping. Even if intergroup contact theory could work under some highly speciﬁc
conditions, those conditions were thought
to be so infrequent and difﬁcult to achieve
that researchers turned elsewhere for ideas on
how to improve intergroup attitudes. As we
now know with the beneﬁt of hindsight, this
abandonment was premature. More recently,
some social scientists have begun to realize
that many of the “necessary” conditions—
including Allport’s original four—were actually not essential for intergroup contact theory
to work. Although these additional conditions
facilitate more optimal outcomes, they are not
necessary for contact to result in more positive intergroup attitudes. Thus the theory was
brought back into the realm of practicality and
became a topic of renewed research interest
(see, e.g., Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew & Tropp
2000).
Likewise, some scholars have already
thrown their hands up in the face of the
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long list of requirements for effective deliberation, arguing that they are impossible to
achieve and/or unlikely to produce beneﬁts
even if achieved (e.g., Sanders 1997). This
reaction is unfortunate because some subset of these necessary conditions (or combinations of them) are probably effective in
producing some of these consequences. Empirical researchers simply have not done a
good job of ﬁguring out which are essential. It would be unfortunate to have the baby
thrown out with the bathwater, but this is precisely what happened with intergroup contact
theory.
As with the development of most theories of human behavior, a second step in this
process of building useful empirical knowledge would involve progressively more complicated research designs. Most human behavior is sufﬁciently complex that mere additive
models are unlikely to account for it. Instead,
it is likely that many of the factors in the left
column of Table 1 interact with other factors
in inﬂuencing these outcomes. Thus, it would
not be logical to ask how well a given deliberative encounter stacked up on all of the factors,
create a combined score of deliberative goodness, and expect more beneﬁcial outcomes associated with higher scores. This approach
would be parsimonious, but it is unlikely to
work because (a) not all necessary conditions
are critical for producing each consequence,
and (b) many of the factors are likely to interact with one another.
Imagine, for example, political discourse
that involved extensive reason-giving but also
tremendous incivility. Would it be logical to
anticipate that this combination would produce beneﬁcial consequences such as greater
willingness to compromise? Wouldn’t one
logically expect the various components to interact with one another such that some components (e.g., reason-giving) without another
condition (e.g., civility) could have worse
results than no deliberation at all? Interactive
rather than additive relationships are the
norm when modeling complex human behaviors (e.g., Kam & Franzese 2007).
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If the real hypothesis of interest here concerns interaction effects—that is, when political discourse simultaneously meets some
group of these conditions—then it cannot be
tested without identifying deliberative situations that include all of these conditions.
As recounted above, theorists may well argue that a given instance of deliberation produces legitimacy to the extent that it merely
approaches its ideals, in which case perfection
of this process is beside the point. But surely
there is some minimal level of each of these
criteria that must be met to produce beneﬁcial
consequences of some kind, a “tipping point,”
before which many of these outcomes are unlikely. If this is not the case—if certain minimal conditions do not need to be met—why
include these criteria as part of deliberation’s
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions to begin
with?
Assuming that researchers are interested in
the question of whether societies are better off
investing lots of time and effort in perfecting
deliberative decision-making processes, and
given the agreed-on impossibility of achieving all of these necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, how can we proceed? If we could safely
assume that the factors identiﬁed as constituting deliberation contribute via independent,
additive relationships to the desired outcomes
of deliberation, then the potential for this
kind of research would be far more promising. Unfortunately, this does not seem likely.
Nonetheless, empirical studies of deliberation
would do best by starting small, examining
one or two of the necessary conditions relative to speciﬁc consequences that follow in
a theoretically logical way. If all variables are
thrown in at once (reason-giving talk among
equals with moderators to ensure equal, rulegoverned participation, and a binding consensus at the end, versus no encounter at all), then
the results will not help us streamline deliberative theory down to its essential elements. If
the theory retains as much baggage as it currently carries, it risks squandering its ultimate
potential.

CONSISTENCY BETWEEN
HYPOTHESES AND
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE
Textbook descriptions of good empirical theory routinely include the requirement of
consistency with previous evidence. This requirement is intended to help move theory
and research forward more quickly and efﬁciently. Why waste time proposing a theory
for which there is already a substantial body
of contradictory evidence?
As an empirical theory, deliberative theory has been widely criticized for making assumptions that seem to ﬂy in the face of
what scholars already know about human behavior. By this, I do not mean that previous research suggests that humans cannot approximate deliberation, but rather that the
implied consequences of such participation
are unlikely based on what we know about
the consequences of human communication.
In other words, even if we achieved the hypothetical ideal speech situation, it would not
lead to the kind of outcomes that the theory envisions. Instead, previous theories tell
us that information processing is inﬂuenced
by characteristics of the listener or message
recipient, the speaker, the message itself, and
the context in which the deliberation occurs.
Notably, only one of these sources of inﬂuence (the message) should matter in a theory
where “the force of the better argument” is
assumed to carry the day. Although a single
article cannot possibly review the large body
of evidence relevant to this particular weakness of deliberative theory (but see Krupnikov
et al. 2007 for an attempt), for purposes of
illustration I provide a few examples of empirically well-supported theories of human behavior that appear inconsistent with deliberative theory. In these selected examples, factors other than argument quality are inﬂuential in bringing about opinion change, thus
casting doubt on the idea that even wellreasoned, sincere, persuasive argumentation
can bring about superior decision-making
processes, more consensual decision-making,
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and so forth. To reiterate, the theories and
evidence that I review here do not speak
to whether deliberation itself is feasible, but
rather to whether, even if we do manage to
coax it into existence, its consequences are
likely to be as advertised. If people were all
of equal status, if women spoke out as often as men, and if people were respected
equally regardless of educational level, rhetorical skills, and so forth, can we be assured
that deliberation would work? Very few social scientists could offer assurance in this regard. Within the social sciences, large-scale,
federally funded research on persuasion was
instigated around the turn of the century
in response to concerns that America (and
her enemies) could be persuaded by other
than rational means, particularly by means
of war-related propaganda (see, e.g., Sproule
1989). The outgrowth of research on persuasion in subsequent decades was not particularly reassuring; people could not always be
counted on to resist irrational arguments or to
ignore superﬂuous cues. What followed was a
cataloging over many years of the sources of
bias in information processing, including conﬁrmatory bias (Lord et al. 1979), perseverance
bias (Ross et al. 1975), and responsiveness to
peripheral cues (Petty & Cacioppo 1981), to
name just a few.
Within political science, the most commonly investigated source of bias in processing new information is the person doing the
processing. Deliberative theory typically assumes that people come to the table with opinions and that they are willing to justify those
views publicly in a way that brings people’s
views closer together rather than increases
conﬂict. The problem with this assumption is
that people with different pre-existing opinions and partisan orientations are unlikely to
respond the same way to a given argument, regardless of its inherent rationality and appeal.
In a deliberative encounter, given the requirement of respectful attention, we should
assume that people will not be able to selectively expose themselves to different types
of information. Unfortunately, people may
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still selectively interpret the implications and
importance of new information, typically so
that it does not threaten their initial predispositions. In the earliest empirical studies of
the impact of information on mass opinion,
Campbell et al. (1960, p. 133) noted, “Identiﬁcation with a party raises a perceptual screen
through which an individual tends to see what
is favorable to his partisan orientation.” Subsequent research has accentuated the importance of this original observation. The now
extensive literature on selective processing of
information calls into question the idea that
deliberation, through the force of rational argument, will gradually bring people closer together and make mutually agreeable compromise possible (see Bartels 2002, cf. Gerber &
Green 1998, 1999). When new information
enters an environment, opinionated citizens
tend to adjust their views in the same general
direction, but they seldom converge—even
when the new information seems to have obviously unidirectional implications for the issue
at hand. Of course, open-mindedness is also
a prerequisite in some deﬁnitions of deliberation, which might seem to eliminate the potential for this problem. But so long as people
hold initial opinions on an issue, as is true of
most issues worth discussing among the public, their information processing is likely to
be inﬂuenced by them. People need not be
closed-minded and dogmatic in order for biased processing to be problematic.
Whether social scientists like it or not, deliberative encounters are inevitably social situations. Whenever people interact with one another, they will inevitably have many motives
beyond simply the desire to reach the best policy position. They also want to be perceived
as likable and smart, for example. Models of
political reasoning must consider that political reasoning is often motivated by goals other
than accuracy (e.g., Taber et al. 2001).
Most organizers of deliberative events
go to great lengths to assure us that the
information provided is valid and unbiased
toward any particular outcome, but faith in the
deliberative enterprise rests on believing that
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organizers and moderators have somehow
overcome their own biases and also counteracted social psychological biases among their
participants. Their efforts to ensure more deliberative group dynamics are admirable, yet
many possible dynamics are unlikely to be
recognized based on casual observation. And
even when people are motivated purely by a
desire to reach the best, most accurate conclusion with their fellow deliberators, they are
still subject to conscious and unconscious biases as they process what they hear. These biases call into question whether the process of
persuasive argumentation will necessarily lead
to a better outcome. For example, if one person claims to have a larger number of arguments than another, he or she will be more
persuasive, even when both people in fact
give the same number of arguments (see Petty
& Cacioppo 1981, Chaiken 1987). In addition, even if everyone in the deliberative encounter views one another as equal in status,
it is likely that some will attribute their views
or arguments to entities of higher status who
are not present (e.g., God), thus making it impossible for the argument to stand solely on
the force of its own merit (see, e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo 1981).
Disagreements—a core requirement in deliberative settings—appear to trigger greater
stereotyping of out-group members (see
Sinclair & Zunda 2000). This phenomenon
allows the in-group member to dismiss the
out-group member’s views, thus preventing
the kind of mutual understanding that is a
central deliberative beneﬁt. So even if welleducated, older, white males were not more
likely to participate in political discussion, and
all contributed equally, respectfully, and so
forth, there would still be a tendency for the
in-group arguments to hold sway over those
of out-groups.
In addition, speaking ﬁrst or last in a given
discussion can bias the extent to which one’s
arguments are memorable and inﬂuential in
shaping opinions (see Haugtvedt & Wegener
1994). Those who go ﬁrst are in a better position to deﬁne the terms of the debate, framing

how it is discussed substantively in a way that
favors their own perspective.
Entire textbooks are devoted to the enormous list of potential sources of bias in information processing and attitude change, thus I
cannot go into all of them here. Today’s models of biased processing are typical of contemporary political psychology in that they share
an underlying skepticism that information is
the cure for all that ails the quality of political
decisions. If people are not passive recipients
of information, but rather active choosers, interpreters, and rationalizers, then the beneﬁts of both information and deliberation—
however closely controlled—are limited. It is
a tall order to expect leaders and moderators to be able to control all of these interactions and potential sources of bias, particularly when many are not easily observed or
anticipated. Moreover, any system whose usefulness depends wholly on locating disinterested, nonpartisan moderators is in trouble to
begin with.
Upon reviewing even this small sample of
evidence, it is clear that there are many established theories of group dynamics, communication, and persuasion that are inconsistent with deliberative theory. These are
not theories merely suggesting that people do not measure up to deliberative standards when they engage in political discourse;
rather, these theories call into question the
likelihood of beneﬁcial results even when
people do achieve such lofty goals. Clearly,
given its lack of consistency with previous
evidence, deliberative theory does not meet
this particular standard for productive social
theory.

HOW MIGHT WE MOVE
FORWARD?
It is difﬁcult to exaggerate the current enthusiasm for deliberation. The amount of time and
money invested in it by governments, foundations, and citizen groups is staggering relative to virtually any other current social science theory. Now that thousands of local and
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national deliberative forums have been held,
one would expect to know far more than we do
about when and why it works well to produce
various outcomes.
As someone who has studied elements of
deliberation in limited ways over the years,
I believe the theory has generated important
empirical scholarship. But I remain uneasy
with the progress that empiricists have made
in understanding what actually transpires in
such complex situations. In many ways, we are
victims of our own desire to live up to the requirements of normative theorists in testing
this theory. Scholars typically try to put all of
a particular list of required conditions into a
single deliberative encounter to study. Doing
so might indeed make deliberative theorists
more likely to take note of the ﬁndings, but
in the end scientiﬁc progress on deliberative
theory will suffer as a result. Thus, ultimately,
I advocate dropping tests of “deliberative theory” per se in favor of testing middle-range
theories. This avenue is likely to be a more
productive means of evaluating the theory,
and one that allows us to remain focused on
essentials.
I am not suggesting that work must conform to this approach in order to contribute
signiﬁcantly to academic knowledge. Instead,
I am suggesting that without a systematic
framework along these lines, there is little hope that empirical research will usefully
speak to deliberative theory, nor that theory
will speak to practice.
It is informative that in his introductory
section, Thompson (2008) mentions “a profusion of empirical studies, now more numerous than the normative works that prompted
them,” whereas empirical scholars suggest
that this area of study is in its infancy, and
“not yet very rich or deep” (Ryfe 2005,
p. 64). Likewise, Delli Carpini and colleagues
(2004, p. 316) conclude, “Unfortunately, empirical research on deliberative democracy
has lagged signiﬁcantly behind theory.” Despite the seeming contradiction, both of these
claims have the ring of truth. Although empirical work has indeed proliferated, it is not clear
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what we have learned as a result. Research
on deliberation suffers from (a) too many
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, which
are each insufﬁciently well-speciﬁed concepts;
(b) a lack of speciﬁcation of the relationships
among the parts comprising the deliberative
whole, and their theoretical linkage to the
desired outcomes; and (c) a lack of a “control group,” that is, a baseline for comparison with other modes of decision making, or
of achieving better-informed, more enlightened opinions, or of increasing willingness to
compromise, or of attaining any other beneﬁt
attributed to deliberation (see Johnson 1998
and Schauer 1999 for a discussion of deliberation relative to alternatives). Deliberation
is not the only means of pursuing these various ends, and advocates and detractors alike
should ﬁnd it useful to know how effective it
is relative to other means.
It is in some ways unfortunate that deliberative theory is a cause célèbre for its advocates, as well as an important social theory. I
say this not because I anticipate that it will necessarily have negative effects on democracy
when implemented, but rather because once
a phenomenon acquires such a head of steam
as the deliberative democracy movement has,
it seldom slows down for purposes of advancing scientiﬁc understanding. Instead, there is
a rush to implement deliberative encounters
willy-nilly, because advocates genuinely believe that its consequences must, of necessity,
be beneﬁcial. Just as drug companies cannot
be counted on to publicize the negative side
effects of their drugs, advocates—whether individuals or large organizations—who have
invested huge amounts of time, energy, and
money into organizing and promoting deliberation are not likely to be the ﬁrst to perceive,
let alone publicize, any shortcomings. Thus,
whether the consequences of deliberation are,
in fact, consistently beneﬁcial or not, without
careful, methodical study, we will not know
why in either case.
Attention has now turned to large-scale,
institutional implementation of deliberative
practices. These projects are not oriented

ANRV344-PL11-23

ARI

17 April 2008

13:16

around the best possible research designs for
purposes of understanding what deliberation
can and cannot deliver so much as they are

designed to spread an already accepted practice as widely as possible. I think this kind of
action is premature.
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